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THE CONSTITUTION AND THE "TRANSITORY"
CAUSE OF ACTION t
BrainerdCurrie *
Professor Currie, having developed in the first part of his article
the theory that the Supreme Court erred in grounding its decision
in Hughes v. Fetter on the full-faith-and-credit clause instead of
the equal-protection clause, now proceeds to consider situations in
the conflict of laws in which the former provision is applicable.
His conclusion sets forth the boundaries of a state's obligation to
provide a forum for causes of action created by the laws of a sister
state.

IV.

T

FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AS AN "OPEN

DooR" PoLicY

HE most significant paragraph in the majority opinion in

Hughes v. Fetter is the second. 6 ' Here the Court first
states the question to be decided, assuming in the process that
the right of action to be enforced was one created by the laws of
Illinois. 6 Then comes the following chain of reasoning: (I)
The Illinois statute is a "public act" within the meaning of the
full-faith-and-credit clause; (2) Wisconsin cannot escape "this
constitutional obligation to enforce the rights and duties validly
created under the laws of other states by the simple device of
removing jurisdiction from courts otherwise competent"; 165 (3)
but the operation of full faith and credit is not automatic; it is
for the Court to "choose in each case between the competing
public policies involved." 166 This is followed by a particularly
significant passage:
The clash of interests in cases of this type has usually been described as a conflict between the public policies of two or more
t The first part of this article appeared in the November issue. Currie, The
Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HARV. L. REv. 36 (1959).
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. LL.B., Mercer Univ., 1935,
A.B. i937; LL.M., Columbia, 1941, J.S.D., x955.
163 341 U.S. at 6I1.
164 As the tenth footnote emphasizes, no choice-of-law problem was before
the Court. 341 U.S. at 612 n.io. The plaintiff had expressly founded his com-

plaint
on the Illinois statute.
.65 Id. at 61. (Emphasis added.)
66
' Id at 61x.
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states. The more basic conflict involved in the present appeal,
however, is as follows: On the one hand is the strong unifying
principle embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause looking
toward maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations or
rights created or recognized by the statutes of sister states; on
the other hand is the policy of Wisconsin, as interpreted by its
highest court, against permitting Wisconsin courts to entertain this
wrongful death action. 6 7
It is indeed true that the Court had previously approached
problems of full faith and credit to the public acts of a sister
state in terms of the respective policies, or interests, of the states
involved. 6" Why, then, did not Mr. Justice Black employ that
approach here? Offhand, one might surmise that the Court was
shying away from the "delicate" and "refractory" problem of
weighing and choosing between conflicting state interests; 169
a federal-state conflict is easier to handle since, whatever the
relative merits of the two policies, the supremacy clause 17o will
in the end require that national policy prevail. On closer inspection, a more cogent reason appears: If the Court had stated the
problem in terms of the opposing interests of the respective states,
it could hardly have avoided the conclusion that Illinois, the
state of injury, had no interest in the enforcement of a cause of
action for wrongful death in the circumstances.171 Wisconsin, as
the home state of all the parties and the state in which the action
was brought, was the only state concerned, and it had declared
its policy -albeit
one which, on the analysis employed in this
paper, was unconstitutional because of its discriminatory character. "' An analysis of the interests of the two states, therefore, would have led to the conclusion that Wisconsin was under
no obligation to defer to the policy of Illinois, and to affirmance
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's judgment. This, however, was
a result from which the majority instinctively recoiled, and this
.6Id. at 611-12. (Footnotes omitted.)
18 See generally Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmen-

tal Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 9 (1958). It is also true
that on occasion the Court had treated such problems in a conceptualistic manner
which took no account of state interests. Id. at 75-76.
19 See Watson v. Employers Liab. Ins. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 78 (1954) (concurring opinion).
170 U. S. CoNsT. art. VI, para. 2.
17 See pp. 45-49 supra.
172 See pp. 6o-66 supra.
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reaction was thoroughly justified for reasons which have been indicated. The infirmities of the Wisconsin policy in the light of
the equal-protection clause had not been called to the attention
of the Court by counsel; accordingly, the Court sought a treatment which would invalidate the policy under the full-faith-andcredit clause and seized upon the concept of conflict between
state and national policy.
In terms of the future development of the law, this was an unfortunate decision. The full-faith-and-credit clause does, of
course, express a national policy, but what is it? Certainly not
that each state shall be required to conform to the Restatement.
In support of his proposition that national policy "look[s] toward
maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations or rights
created or recognized by the statutes of sister states," '173 Mr.

Justice Black cited only three cases - two dealing with full
faith and credit to judgments 174 and one requiring application
of the laws of the state wherein a fraternal insurance society
was incorporated, in which he had expressed a vigorous dissent.' 7

5

These cases fall far short of furnishing an adequate basis for the
proposition that the full-faith-and-credit clause requires a state
to provide a forum for every wrongful-death action based upon
injury in a sister state, to say nothing of the proposition that
in the interest of uniformity the law of the state of injury must
be applied. The policy embodied in the full-faith-and-credit
clause is that each state shall give appropriate effect to the public
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of sister states, and shall
refrain from intruding its own notions and policies into matters
which are properly the concern of others. Just how the Court is
to determine what effect is appropriate, and where the concerns of
one state end, is of course a basic and difficult question. Mr. justice Black, however, would be among the last to contend, or even
to concede, that the determination is to be made with reference
to talismanic "contacts" which are thought to support the exercise of territorial power. 7 6 There exist situations in which obli73

1

341 U.S. at 612.

174

Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (i943) ; Milwaukee County

v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
'7 Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S.
586, 625 (1947).
176 In addition to his dissent in the Wolfe case, supra note 175, see Watson v.
Employers Liab. Ins. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen,
318 U.S. 313 (1943).
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gations or rights rest exclusively upon the laws of a foreign state,
and in which the Constitution requires maximum recognition of
those rights in the forum state.17 7 In such situations, however,
the foreign state has a legitimate interest in the effectuation of
the policy embodied in its laws and the forum state has no interest in the effectuation of any conflicting policy of its own.
Hughes v.Fetter did not present such a situation.

The Hughes case, therefore, is distinctly aberrational as an
application of the full-faith-and-credit clause. This is not to
say, however, that the clause never requires a state to provide a
forum for the enforcement of claims predicated upon the laws
of a sister state. The extent to which it must do so is the problem to be considered here. We are not primarily concerned with
the choice-of-law cases, i.e., those in which a state has voluntarily provided a forum and then has applied its own law in preference to that of a sister state,' 7 but rather with those in which
a state has simply refused to entertain the action. In these cases
the forum does not, openly at least, pose any disagreement with
the social and economic policy embodied in the foreign law; instead it invokes, more or less explicitly, some independent local
law or policy relating to the jurisdiction or administration of its
courts. Sometimes it may do this in order to camouflage what
is in fact a purpose to discriminate against foreign interests
(though we shall not encounter again anything so bizarre as the
incidental discrimination by Wisconsin and Illinois against their
own citizens). Our principal concern, however, will be with the
situation in which the forum state has no ulterior motive, but
simply closes the doors of its courts in accordance with a bona
fide policy relating to matters of judicial administration.' 79
171 See, e.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. z78 (1936)

(concerning choice of law rather than access to courts).
1"'8 See generally Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the JudicialFunction, 26 U. Cma. L. Rxv.9 (1958).
179 The treatment will not be exhaustive. A number of topics might be treated
under the head of denial of access to courts on grounds relating to judicial administration. See generally Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw.
U.L. Rxv. 541, 568-74 (1958). In particular, the invocation of various "procedural"
laws of the forum, such as the statute of limitations, to support dismissal may
involve policies relating to the administration of courts, but other policies may
be involved also. Here we shall concentrate upon the overt refusal of a state to
open the doors of its courts in the first place.
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A. Actions on Judgments of Sister States
The national policy embodied in the full-faith-and-credit clause,
"looking toward maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations or rights created . . . by . . . sister states,"

180

has been

most clearly articulated and implemented with respect to judgments- particularly for money.1381 Concerning judgments, Congress has meaningfully exercised its power to declare the effect
in one state of the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings
of another: They are to be given such faith and credit "as they
have by law or usage in the courts of such State . . . from which

they are taken." 182 Neither the outraged interests of the forum '"
nor manifest error on the part of the rendering court 184 will
justify a refusal of enforcement. If a state may refuse to enforce
a sister state's money judgment on grounds of policy relating to
judicial administration, a fortiori it should be able to refuse on
such grounds to enforce claims not reduced to judgment. With
respect to such claims Congress has not spoken in any meaningful
way.

1 85

In 1903 the Supreme Court held that New York was not obliged
by the full-faith-and-credit clause to enforce an Illinois money
judgment at the suit of one Illinois corporation against another."8 6
New York's refusal was based upon a section of the Code of Civil
Procedure' l providing that an action might be maintained
against a foreign corporation by another foreign corporation, or
by a nonresident, only in certain enumerated cases, one of which
was "where the cause of action arose within the State." The
purpose of the provision had been stated by the New York Court
of Appeals as follows:
The discrimination between resident and non-resident plaintiffs
is probably based on reasons of public policy, that our courts
should not be vexed with litigations between non-resident parties
180 341 U.S. at 612.
181 See generally Currie,

Cni. L. REv.

Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U.

620 (1954).

183

§ 1738 (1952).
See Fauntleroy v. LuM, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).

184

See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940)-

182 28 U.S.C.

See note 162 supra.
180 Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., No. 1, 191 U.S. 373

18'

(1903).

187 2 N.Y. Sess. Laws i88o, ch. 178, N.Y. Code Civ. Proc. § 1780(3)
(1883), as
amended, N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAw § 225(3).
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over causes of action which arose outside of our territorial limits.

Every rule of comity and of natural justice and of convenience is
satisfied by giving redress in our courts to non-resident litigants
when the cause of action arose, or the subject-matter of the litigation is situated within this state.188
These reasons are substantially those underlying the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.' 9 They express a policy relating to the
administration of the courts. There is no suggestion whatever of
any hostility on the part of New York to the underlying cause
of action, which arose out of ordinary commercial transactions;
nor is there any suggestion of a desire to shield local against foreign interests. The case therefore presents in the clearest possible way the issue of whether the forum's policies relating to the
administration of its courts can justify the refusal to enforce a
foreign judgment.
With characteristic brevity, Mr. Justice Holmes seized upon
the fact that the New York Court of Appeals had, in passing, referred to the limitation imposed by the Code of Civil Procedure
as one on the jurisdiction of courts,'91 and proceeded to declare
that the full-faith-and-credit clause is not a rule of jurisdiction,
requiring the state to provide a forum, but only a rule of evidence
stating how the judgment in suit is to be treated if the state does
provide a forum. As we shall see, the distinction is neither workable nor convincing.' 9' The only apparent justification for the
decision is that, despite the national interest in maximum enforcement of state-created rights, the interest of Illinois in the effectuation of its legal policies, and the interest of the plaintiff in
the enforcement of its adjudicated rights, the counterinterest of
New York in keeping its courts free from the burden of litigation
with which it has no concern is sufficient to deflect the force of
the full-faith-and-credit clause.
188 Robinson v. Oceanic Steam Nay. Co.,

X12

N.Y. 315, 323-24,

E9

N.E. 625,

627 (1889). See also Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 169
N.Y. 506, 513, 62 N.E. 587, 590 (1902).
18'

See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (I947).

See generally Blair,

The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 CoLum. L.
REv. i (1929); Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 6o HARv. L. Rav.
908 (1947).
1"0 Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 169 N.Y. 5o6, 513,
62 N.E. 587, 590 (1902).
191 See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 234-35 (I908).
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On the face of the matter, this seems a not unreasonable justification. 19 2 But suppose that the only assets of the judgment debtor
are located in the state in which enforcement is sought. In such
a case, a policy like that of New York will effectually deprive the
plaintiff of what the Illinois courts have adjudicated to be his;
and this, in view of the clear constitutional and congressional policy of interstate respect for judgments, seems a high price to pay
for New York's autonomy in regulating the business of its courts.
The actual situation in the case under discussion was equivalent
to that which has been supposed: The judgment defendant was insolvent; its only asset was a judgment which it had obtained in
New York against the plaintiff. 9 3 The defendant's judgment,
which arose out of the same series of transactions as the plaintiff's, was in an amount greater than the Illinois judgment in suit.
The defendant was taking steps to collect its judgment in New
York, and the only purpose of the suit on the Illinois judgment
was to establish it as a set-off. The net result of the litigation was
that the attempted set-off was frustrated. 10' 4 Such a result seems
indefensible. 95 There is little reason why a judgment creditor
should engage in forum-shopping in suing on his judgment. Normally, his only purpose in bringing such an action is to reach assets or, as here, to establish a set-off; the choice of forum is dic.92 I have elsewhere defended the position that the counterinterest of the forum
state is sufficient to defeat a demand that the law of the foreign state be applied
to a case which the forum has undertaken to adjudicate. See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function,
26 U. C'ir. L. REv. 9 (1958).
191
193See Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., No. 2,
U.S. 376 (x9o3).
194 It is not clear how, in the face of § 1780 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
the defendant was able to obtain its New York judgment. The objection seems
not to have been raised in that proceeding. See Record, Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., No. 2, 191 U.S. 376 (x9o3). It may be that §
178o did not apply because the cause of action in that proceeding was considered
as having arisen in New York.
"95 Actually, a United States district court in New York, whose sympathy for
the plaintiff's plight led it to stretch its jurisdiction in an effort to afford relief,
came to the conclusion that there was no right of set-off on the merits, since the
rights which ripened into the New York judgment had been assigned in good
faith and for a valuable consideration to another. See Record, pp. 129-32, AngloAmerican Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., No. 2, 191 U.S. 376 (i9o3). But
the decision in Anglo-American No. z takes no account of that circumstance; and
in a similar case today, involving a genuine right to set-off, counsel would have
considerable difficulty in distinguishing the precedent; the insolvent defendant
would logically recover its New York judgment in full.
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tated simply by the location of the defendant's assets.'
Moreover, the burden on the New York courts of entertaining suits on
sister-state judgments is slight, since the original cause of action
is, of course, merged, and the issues which are open to litigation
are few. In the case under discussion, entertaining the action
would probably have involved no more than the routine entry of
summary judgment. New York's interest is attenuated, and the
considerations favoring enforcement are very strong.
We must be wary, however, of any suggestion that the Supreme
Court should have treated the New York interest as "outweighed"
by the countervailing interests. New York's interest in the efficiency of the courts which it maintains at its own expense is not
negligible. A determination that that interest is less important
than the interest of Illinois in the enforcement of its judgments
involves essentially the exercise of political discretion. The Court,
I believe, would have been justified in requiring New York to entertain the action only on one of two theories: (i) that Congress,
in the exercise of its power to declare the effect of the judgments
of one state in the courts of another, has in fact determined that
the forum state's interest in regulating the business of its courts
must yield to the interest in nationwide enforcement; or (2) that
the interest of a state in regulating the business of its courts is of
a different and lower order than the interest of a state in regulating its social and economic structure apart from the court system, so that the Court itself is in position to say that the former
type of interest shall yield to the latter. The first of these theories
is an appealing one. The second is rather more difficult to accept, and we shall be concerned with it in connection with the
problem of access to courts for actions not based upon judgment.
Seventeen years later Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
Court in the Kenney case, said: "[I]t is plain that a state cannot
escape its constitutional obligations by the simple device of denying jurisdiction in such cases to courts otherwise competent." 197
196 In § i78o itself New York recognized the reasonableness of this general

kind of resort to its courts by nonresidents, allowing suits for the purpose of
recovering real or personal property located in the state.
197 Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, Loyal Order of Moose, 252 U.S. 411, 415
(X920). In his youth Mr. Justice Holmes was greatly influenced by Ralph Waldo
Emerson. See HowE, JUsTICE OLIVER WENDEL HoL s: THE SHAPING YEARS
54 (i957); BOWEN, YxANE
FROm OLYPUS 199 (1944). It was Emerson who
said: "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little
statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply
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Confronted with his earlier declaration that the full-faith-andcredit clause establishes a rule of evidence rather than of jurisdiction, he replied, "Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. was a suit by a foreign corporation on a foreign judgment against a foreign corporation. The decision is sufficiently
explained without more by the views about foreign corporations
that had prevailed unquestioned since Bank of Augusta v. Earle,
13 Pet. 519, 589-591, cited 191 U.S. 375"

198

Kenney, it will be recalled, was the case in which the Court
held unconstitutional the exclusionary proviso of the Illinois
wrongful-death statute as applied to judgments.' 99 Two residents
of Alabama died in the process of being initiated into a local
lodge of the Loyal Order of Moose, an Indiana corporation." 0
Having recovered in the Alabama courts, the administrators
brought suit on their judgments in Illinois, where they were able
to attach property of the corporation. 20 1 More specifically than
had the New York Court of Appeals in the Anglo-American case,
nothing to do." E~mRSON, Self-Reliance, in EssAYs 83, 93 (Jordan ed. 19o7).
198 252 U.S. at 414. The citation referred to is as follows: "The general power
of a State to restrict the right of a foreign corporation to sue in its courts is assumed in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 589-591." There is no other reference in the opinion to the power over foreign corporations. Three years after
the Kenney case, over Mr. justice Holmes' dissent, the Court held that the equalprotection clause imposes limits on the power of a state to obstruct access to its
courts by a foreign corporation seeking recovery of personal property in the state.
Kentucky Fin. Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544 (1923).
1go Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, Loyal Order of Moose, 252 U.S. 411 (1920).
20The
details are not important except, perhaps, insofar as they may be
thought to have affected the sympathies of the Court. An account of them is
reproduced here primarily because no such account is to be found either in the
reports or in the record:
Two candidates for membership in the Loyal Order of Moose were killed
some years ago during an initiation in a lodge at Birmingham, Alabama. They
were Donald A. Kenny, president of the local Chauffeurs' Union, and Christopher Gustin, an iron moulder. Physicians were undecided as to whether
they were frightened to death or killed by electricity. It is stated that a metal
emblem of the order was made red hot while they looked on. Their chests
were bared and they were blindfolded. A magneto was attached to one leg
of each candidate, a chilled rubber emblem was placed against the breast, and
an electric current was completed by a small wire touching the shoulder. The
aim evidently was to make them believe that the red hot metal was applied to
the flesh. Both men fainted. It was thought they were feigning, and the presiding officer did not stop the initiation till it was seen that the two men were
dying. The lodge physician was unable to revive them.
PREuss, A DIcTIoNARY OF SECRET AND OTHER SOCIETIES 258 (1924).
20' Record, pp. 3, 9-13. While the Order was incorporated in Indiana, id. at 3,
it is possible that it may have been regarded as a local enterprise by the Illinois
courts, since the national headquarters were in Illinois and a sizable establishment
was maintained there. See Paxuss, op. cit. supra note 2oo, at 258-59.
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the Illinois Supreme Court declared the local statute a limitation
on the jurisdiction of the courts. 20 2 The two cases, then, are
nearly parallel. The superficial differences between them- the
fact that in one the plaintiff was a foreign corporation while in
the other he was a nonresident administrator, and the difference
between the causes of action merged in the respective judgments
-seem
unimportant. 0 3 There is a less obvious difference, however, which is significant. The New York courts had expressly
declared a policy relating to the efficiency of the state's judicial
system; the Illinois courts, as we have seen earlier, had at no
time articulated the policy underlying that state's exclusionary
proviso. That proviso stood as an unexplained and arbitrary
limitation on the jurisdiction of the courts; if the surmises advanced previously have any validity, a statement of the real purpose, which was to protect local interests against the interests of
nonresidents, would not have been conducive to a different decision. In short, these two cases may be regarded as consistent and
as supporting the proposition that a state may legitimately apply
a policy of forum non conveniens, if it has such a policy, to
actions on sister-state judgments. Such a proposition, however,
does not comport well with the needs of the federal system and
with the resolution of the conflicting interests which was apparently made by the first Congress. At least in cases in which the
state where the action on the judgment is filed is the only one in
which there are assets of the judgment debtor, the equal-protection clause should perhaps be applied to afford relief if the fullfaith-and-credit clause, implemented by congressional action, is
inadequate for the purpose. 0 4
Further support for the view that a policy directed in good
faith to the administration of the judicial system of the forum
state is an adequate reason for not entertaining an action on a
sister-state judgment is provided by the well established rule that
202

Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, Loyal Order of Moose, 285 Ill. 188, 193, 120

N.E. 63x, 632 (191S), rev'd, 252 U.S. 411 (1920).
203

In Fauntleroy v. Lum,

210

U.S.

230

(19o8), the Court had held quite firmly

that hostility to the underlying cause of action did not provide an excuse for refusing relief on a sister-state judgment; this position was reaffirmed in Kenney. 252
U.S. at 415. See also Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
204See Kentucky Fin. Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544
(1923). See also Cook, The Powers of Congress under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, 28 YAi.x L.J. 421, 431-32 (1919).
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the forum may apply its own statute of limitations. 20 5 A statute
of limitations may reasonably be interpreted as expressing two
policies: one of protecting persons within the scope of the state's
governmental concern from the risk of liability where lapse of
time has rendered the plaintiff's evidence unreliable and the defendant's evidence difficult to produce, and one of protecting the
courts against the difficulties and frustrations of adjudication in
such circumstances. If the latter of these policies seems a bit farfetched, it nevertheless suggests the only hypothesis on which one
can give a meaningful explanation 206 for the general practice
of applying the forum's statute of limitations in cases in which
the forum state can have no possible interest except one relating
to the administration of its courts.
The other cases in which the Court has dealt with a state's
refusal to enforce the judgment of another state make it clear
that antipathy toward the underlying cause of action is not an
excuse. 20 7 The most interesting thing about them, in this context, is that in not one of them did the forum state suggest that
its refusal was grounded in concern for the administration of its
judicial system. The net result is that, apart from the protection
of local people and enterprises when the judgment itself is a stale
claim, no interest whatever of the forum state can justify its refusal to enforce the money judgment of a sister state - except an
interest in the administration of its court system. This is in
marked contrast to the situation in which an action is predicated
on foreign law rather than a foreign judgment, and the fullfaith-and-credit clause is relied on as controlling the choice of the
applicable law. There, broadly speaking, any legitimate interest
of the forum state suffices to justify its application of its own law
205 See M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (I3 Pet.) 312 (1839);

cf. Union Nat'l

Bank
v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38 (i949).
20
As distinguished from an explanation based on the rule of thumb that matters of "procedure" are governed by the law of the forum.
207 Intimations to the contrary in Huntington v. Attrili, 146 U.S. 657 (1892),
and Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (i888), have been discredited. See
Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (i935); Fauntleroy v. Lum,
210 U.S. 230 (1908). See also Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1928); Christmas
v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290 (1866); Jackson, Full Faith and Credit- The
Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 CoLum. L. R1v. i, 9 n.38 (1945). In a
slightly different category is Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947), in which the
interest of the forum state which was overridden by the constitutional mandate
was that asserted by Illinois in conducting a unitary administration of the affairs
of a local insurance enterprise upon its insolvency.
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rather than that of the other state. The contrast is basically understandable, since rights reduced to judgment have a definiteness
which rights asserted under general laws do not, 20° and since the
original act of Congress implementing the full-faith-and-credit
clause dealt expressly with the effect of judgments in such a way
as to support an inference of intent to subordinate the conflicting
policies of the forum state. What is difficult to understand is the
apparent exception in favor of the forum state's policies relating
to judicial administration. The exception would seem anomalous
because of its uniqueness alone; it seems doubly so in the light
of the suggestion that this kind of policy may be of a relatively
low order, inferior to what may be called the "substantive" policies of a state relating to social and economic matters in general.
B. Penal Causes of Action
Not long after the War of 1812, Mr. Chief Justice John Marshall, in the course of developing the argument of his opinion in a
case which involved, along with difficult questions of international
law, freedom or slavery for a boatload of unfortunate Africans who
had been taken from their captors by an American naval vessel,
posed a hypothetical problem and gave his solution to it. The
problem: In time of peace an American naval vessel boards and
searches a Spanish vessel on the high seas and finds it engaged in
the slave trade. The trade is prohibited by American law and
repugnant to our sensibilities. It is also prohibited by the law of
Spain. The American vessel brings the Spanish vessel and its
human cargo into an American port for adjudication. The United
States insists that the captives be set free; their Spanish "owners"
demand restitution. What should the American admiralty court
do? The solution: It should order restitution. The American position with respect to the events leading to the late war with England made it clear that in the absence of treaty we could neither
recognize nor assert a right of visitation and search except in
case of piracy or a violation of the law of nations - and trading
in slaves was neither. Moreover, it was not the business of American courts to enforce the Spanish laws against the slave trade by
decreeing forfeiture of the loot held by the Spanish malefactors; that could be left to the courts of Spain. 09
208
209

See Jackson, supra note 2o7, at ii.

The Antelope,

23

U.S. (io Wheat.) 66,

123

(1825).
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The reader may well inquire what this has to do with the subject under discussion. So far as I can tell it has no relevance
whatever. However, in making his point Marshall coined an
aphorism which the courts persist in quoting, in cases of a type
with which this discussion is concerned, as if it were immutable
truth and indispensable datum: "The Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another . .

210 Since the courts ob-

viously consider this statement important to the subject under
discussion, we must give attention to it, and, of course, we cannot disregard its context.
More than half a century later one Attrill, a resident of New
York, swore to and caused to be recorded a certificate to the effect that the whole of the capital stock of a New York corporation of which he was a director had been paid in. The certificate
was false, as Attrill knew; no part of the capital stock had been
paid in. Under a New York statute Attrill was in these circumstances liable for the debts of the corporation, and a New York
creditor, Huntington, recovered judgment against him in New
York accordingly. This judgment being unsatisfied, Huntington
found that Attrill had owned stock in a Maryland corporation and
had transferred the stock to himself as trustee for his wife
and daughters in an attempt to defraud his creditors. Huntington
thereupon applied to the courts of Maryland to have the fraudulent transfer set aside and the stock subjected to the payment of
his claim. The Maryland Court of Appeals denied relief, saying:
"'[I] t is well settled that no State will enforce penalties imposed
by the laws of other States . . .

211 The Supreme Court re-

versed, but not without first paying deference to Marshall's
aphorism as the essential point of departure for the discussion.2 12
The case is very nearly an ideal one for purposes of the present
discussion. At the time of the transactions in question - and
they were strictly New York transactions - all parties were residents of New York. Indeed, even at the time of the Maryland
litigation no party had any connection with the forum state;
Attrill and his family had become residents of Canada. The only
2

10

Id. at

123.

211 Attrill v. Huntington, 7o Md. 191, 197-98, i6 AtI. 651, 653 (i889).

These

are not precisely Marshall's words, but the court cited two Supreme Court decisions referring expressly to Marshall: Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 227 U.S. 265,
290 (i888) ; Flash v. Conn, io 9 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1883).
212 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 666 (1892).

HeinOnline -- 73 Harv. L. Rev. 280 1959-1960

I9591

THE TRANSITORY

CAUSE OF ACTION

circumstance relating Maryland to the affair was that the action
was brought there, and this was so only because the assets sought
to be reached consisted of stock in a Maryland corporation, which
presumably had no interest in the outcome. Maryland did not assert any interest in applying its law to determine the rights of the
parties. Its refusal to grant relief could be predicated only upon
a policy relating to the administration of its courts - or upon
Marshall's "incontrovertible maxim" 2 13 without reference to any
conscious policy of the state.
Since the action was on a judgment, the considerations discussed in the preceding section are applicable. Applying those
considerations, we should conclude that developments since this
case was decided probably render immaterial the fact that the
underlying cause of action may have been of a type to which the
forum was free to close its doors. 214 That was not the situation
as it appeared to the Court at the time, however; in order to understand the Court's analysis, we must temporarily put aside the
developments which make the character of the underlying cause
of action irrelevant. It is with the application of the full-faithand-credit clause to the underlying cause of action that we are
primarily concerned.
In his generally able and impressive opinion, Mr. Justice Gray
assumed that if the action in Maryland had been predicated upon
the original liability created by the New York statute rather than
upon a judgment, no federal question would have been presented,2 15 although the cases which he cited to this effect 216 could
not have presented a question of full faith and credit. On this
assumption, he quite properly ruled that the question whether
See Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290 (1888).
214Although in Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (I935),
the Court expressly left open the question whether the penal character of the underlying cause of action affects the obligation of full faith and credit to a judgment,
296 U.S. at 279, it also expressly disapproved Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127
U.S. 265 (i888), "so far as the opinion can be taken to suggest that full faith and
credit is not required with respect to a judgment unless the original cause of action would be entitled to like credit . . . ... 296 U.S. at 278.
212

215 146 U.S. at 683.

216 Roth v. Ehman, 107 U.S. 319 (1882); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren,

It is now established, of course, that a federal question under
the full-faith-and-credit clause or the due-process clause may be raised by the
denial of rights asserted under the laws of a sister state. See generally Currie, The
Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial
Function, 26 U. Cui. L. REv. 9 (958).
92 U.S. 286 (1876).
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the cause of action is penal is one to be decided by the law of the
forum; the characterization given it (usually for domestic purposes) by the state creating the right is not controlling. 17 When,
however, the action is not on the original liability but on a
judginent, the forum's refusal to entertain the action raises a
question under the full-faith-and-credit clause. Although Mr.
Justice Gray conceded that the nature of the original cause of
action was not changed by the judgment -and hence that, if
the original cause of action were penal, the judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit - he insisted upon the right of the
Court to determine for itself, in an action on the judgment, the
nature of the original cause of action."' The constitutional mandate of full faith and credit to the judgment would be circumvented if the basis for the recognized exception had no objective
existence. Having determined, by an examination of the commonlaw authorities in general, that the underlying cause of action was
not penal in the international sense, he concluded that full faith
and credit had been denied to the judgment.
The decision stands as indirect authority for the proposition
that a cause of action which is "penal" need not be entertained
by the courts of a state other than that whose law creates the
right; if a judgment based upon a penal cause of action would
not be entitled to recognition, a fortiori the original cause of action would not be. It is unfortunate that this interpretation of
the full-faith-and-credit clause was based not upon an analysis of
the interests of the respective states in the context of the federal
system, but upon common-law precedents reflecting the provincialism of independent sovereignties, and in particular upon the
views of John Marshall as to the appropriate restraints upon our
enthusiasm for abolishing the slave trade throughout the world.
The Court had earlier taken the step of expanding Marshall's
dictum so that it applied "not only to prosecutions and sentences
for crimes and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of the State
for the recovery of pecuniary penalties for any violation of statutes for the protection of its revenue, or other municipal laws
...
,, 219 It remained only to inquire whether the underlying
cause of action was for a penalty, and this question of "interna217
2
1

146 U.S. at 683.

Id.at 683-84.
21 Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290 (3888).
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tional law" 220 was resolved by reference to precedents representing the point of view of the forum state, some having no relation
to the federal system and none considering explicitly the needs of
that system. While the result in the case before the Court was
favorable to the federal interest and the interest of New York in
interstate recognition of the judgment, the way was left open for
a contrary result if reference to the same precedents should characterize the cause of action as penal. The best that can be said of
this technique is that it was premised on the theory that the fullfaith-and-credit clause did not require a state to entertain causes
of action which were not entertained as a matter of comity among
independent nations at the time the Constitution was adopted.
While this was perhaps at one time a plausible interpretation, the
clause takes on greater vitality and makes more sense as an instrument of federalism if it is interpreted and applied in accordance with an analysis of the interests of the respective states.2 1
Such an analysis would have required a statement of the policy
of the forum state underlying its refusal to entertain penal causes
of action. No such statement was forthcoming. It is difficult,
in the circumstances of the Huntington case, to attribute to the
forum state any policy other than that of avoiding the burden
which would be cast upon the local courts by such foreign litigation. If this is the policy, explicit statement of it would enable the
Court to treat the problem as it has treated other similar problems of conflicting state interests.
The nature of the policy considerations which may be of concern to the forum state is suggested by Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins.
Co. 2 212 The case does not involve the full-faith-and-credit clause,

strictly speaking, but the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.22 3 The significant point is that the Court was concerned
about the effect of its becoming a tribunal for the collection of
220

x46 U.S. at 683.

"The very purpose of the full faith and credit clause was to alter the
status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore
obligations created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others,
and to make them integral parts of a single nation throughout which a remedy
upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right, irrespective of the state of
its origin." Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935).
222 127 U.S. 265 (1888).
223 Indeed, some reliance was placed upon the language of the act, i Stat. 8o
(1789) (now 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1952)), defining the original jurisdiction in terms of
221

"controversies of a civil nature .

. ."

Id. at 297.
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even those reduced to judgment

-

upon its effi-

ciency in the performance of its primary duties:
If this court has original jurisdiction of the present case, it must
follow that any action upon a judgment obtained by a State in
her own courts against a citizen of another State for the recovery of
any sum of money, however small, by way of a fine for any offence,
however petty, against her laws, could be brought in the first instance in the Supreme Court of the United States. That cannot
have been the intention of the Convention in framing, or of the
224
people in adopting, the Federal Constitution.
Such a statement of realities has more persuasive force than any
number of reiterations of the dictum that "the courts of no state
enforce the penal laws of another."
The case of Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Nichols 225 may serve
as a reminder that the refusal of a state to entertain a cause of
action having foreign aspects on the ground that it is "penal" can
never be evaluated in the abstract, whether the reason is stated in
terms of the rule of thumb or of realistic concern for the efficiency
of the local courts. The action was brought in a California court
for a death occurring in New Mexico, and was removed to the
United States district court because of diversity of citizenship.
The New Mexico statute provided that the defendant should
"forfeit and pay for every person or passenger so dying, the sum
of five thousand dollars . .

226

The Court held this statute

not penal in the international sense, following Huntington v. Attrill. This falls short of a holding that the full-faith-and-credit
clause required that the action be entertained, since the case was
in the federal courts by virtue of diversity of citizenship and the
Erie doctrine 221 had not been announced. Yet in a repetition of
the case since the Erie decision a contrary result, refusing to entertain the action, would present substantially the same constitutional question that was presented by United Air Lines. 228 The
plaintiff was a citizen of California 229 and so, presumably, was
his wife, the deceased. The defendant was a Kansas corpora224

Id.at 300.

225 264 U.S. 348 (1924).

226 N.M. Laws x882,

ch. 6i, § i, as amended, N.M.

STAT. A N. § 22-20-4

(1953).
227 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
228 First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
22' Record, p. i6, Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Nichols, 264 U.S. 348 (1924).
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tion2 30 doing business in California. Thus the same considerations
which required the district court in Illinois to entertain the action
for wrongful death in United Air Lines would be operative in such
a case - whether they stem from the full-faith-and-credit clause
or the equal-protection clause.
C. Claims for Taxes
Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co.23 ' effectively disposes of
any doubt that the full-faith-and-credit clause requires a state to
enforce the judgment of a sister state even though the underlying
cause of action was a tax claim. Again, this was a pre-Erie diversity case; yet the Court deliberately addressed itself to the
question whether the full-faith-and-credit clause required a state
to entertain an action on a sister-state judgment for taxes, and
reached an affirmative answer.2 32 There is perhaps room for a
trace of doubt as to whether a clear demonstration of a policy
of the forum state designed to relieve its courts of the burden of
such litigation would have tended to produce a different result.
The only policy attributed to the forum was one of avoiding involvement in the relations between the taxing state and its taxpayers, and thus avoiding commitment of the forum "to positions
which might be seriously embarrassing to itself or its neighbors." 23 Rightly enough, the Court dismissed this rather speculative policy as unsubstantial in application to an action on a
judgment brought by the taxing state itself.234 Yet the reasoning
of the opinion leaves little basis for belief that much greater
weight would have been accorded a plea that to entertain actions
on tax judgments would unduly burden the courts of the forum
state. Strong emphasis was placed upon the act of Congress
prescribing the effect of judgments, and on the relative simplicity
of the action based on a judgment.23 5 The implication is that

Congress is understood to have resolved the conflict of interests
by declaring in effect that the conflicting interest of the forum
state must yield.
The question of full faith and credit to the taxing statutes of a
230

Id. at is.

231 296 U.S. 268 (1935).

232 Id.at
233 Id. at
23
4Id. at
235 Id. at

273-79.
275.
276-77.
273, 276.
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sister state was deliberately left open,286 thus leaving as the
leading precedent on that question the somewhat tangential one
of Moore v. Mitchell.2 37 That case held only that the treasurer of
a county in Indiana had no standing to sue in a federal court in
New York, in an action predicated on diversity of citizenship, to
recover taxes allegedly due his county. His capacity was likened
to that of chancery receivers and administrators; the Court actually found it "not necessary to express any opinion upon the question considered below, whether a federal court in one State will enforce the revenue laws of another State." 238 Several states have
voluntarily opened their courts to unliquidated claims by sister
states for taxes, with or without consideration of the full-faithand-credit clause. 3 9 No suggestion is offered here that the Milwaukee County case is dispositive of this problem; the act of
Congress cannot be given the same force with respect to the public
acts of sister states as with respect to their judgments, and actions
on the original tax liability pose litigation problems quite different
from those posed by actions on tax judgments. It is to be hoped,
however, that when this question is presented to the Court the
decision will be in terms of the interests of the respective states
rather than in terms of the tired clich6 to the effect that no state
enforces the revenue laws of another.24 °
D. Stockholders' Liability
In 1897 the legislature of New Jersey enacted the following
provision:
No action or proceeding shall be maintained in any court of law
of this state against any stockholder, officer or director of any
domestic or foreign corporation by or on behalf of any creditor of
such corporation to enforce any statutory personal liability of such
stockholder, officer or director for or upon any debt, default or
obligation of such corporation, whether such statutory personal
liability be deemed penal or contractual, if such statutory per236 Id. at 275.
237 281 U.S. 18 (1930).
238
11d. at 24.

236 Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Neely,

225

Ark.

230, 282

S.W.2d

x5o (1955); City of Detroit v. Gould, 12 I1. 2d 297, 146 N.E.2d 61 (I957); Ohio
ex rel. Duffy v. Arnett, 314 Ky. 403, 234 S.W.2d 722 (i95o); Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 238 Mo. App. 115, 193 S.W.2d 99 (1946); Holshouser
Co. v. Copper Co., 138 N.C. 248, 50 S.E. 650 (19o5).
2 40
See Note, 7 NAT'L BJ. 354 (1949); Comment, 47 Micir. L. REv. 796 (1949);
Note, i8 Co Nza.L L.Q. 58i (1933).
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sonal liability be created by or arise from the statutes or laws of
any other state or foreign country, and no pending or future action
or proceeding to enforce any such statutory personal liability shall
be maintained in any court of this state other than in a nature of
an equitable accounting for the proportionate benefit of all parties
interested, to which such corporation and its legal representatives,
if any, and all of its creditors and all of its stockholders shall be
241
necessary parties.
Thereafter a banking corporation known as the Bank of the
United States was organized under the laws of New York. Those
laws imposed upon stockholders of the bank personal liability for
corporate debts to the extent of the par value of their stock, and
imposed upon the superintendent of banks the duty of making
assessments and enforcing the liability of stockholders. On the
insolvency of the bank the superintendent, after taking the steps
prescribed by the New York statutes, sued in a law court in New
Jersey to enforce the statutory liability of stockholders who were
residents of that state. His complaint was stricken on the authority of the New Jersey statute quoted above.242 On appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that New Jersey had denied full
faith and credit to the public acts of New York. 43 The equitable
proceeding allowed by the statute, in which the presence of the
corporation, all its creditors, and all its stockholders was a jurisdictional prerequisite, was a legal impossibility; the statute effectively denied the right of the superintendent to resort to the
New Jersey courts to enforce the liability of New Jersey residents.244
There could be no clearer holding that in some circumstances
the full-faith-and-credit clause requires a state to entertain, or
furnish a forum for, a cause of action asserted under the statutes
of a sister state.245 The question is: How broad is the requirement, and in what circumstances is it imposed? We have seen
that the legitimate interests of the forum state are not to be disregarded. What policy of New Jersey was subordinated to the
law and policy of New York by this decision?
21 N.J. Laws 1897, ch. 50, § 2 (now N.J. REv. STAT. § 14.7-I, (1937)).
242 Broderick v. Abrams, 113 N.J.L. 305, 174 At. 5o7 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934)

(per curiam).
243
244

Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935).

Id. at 639.

2 "[T]he full faith and credit clause requires that this suit be entertained."

Id. at 647.
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Available sources of information will be searched in vain for
any articulation -

to say nothing of a candid statement

-

of

New Jersey's policy. That state did not itself, so far as appears,
impose personal liability upon stockholders in domestic corporations; but the mere absence of provisions for such liability could
hardly be taken as expressive of an affirmative policy of protecting stockholders in foreign corporations. Probably New Jersey
had, prior to the enactment of this statute, enforced the liability
of its residents as stockholders in foreign corporations; at least
we find a New Jersey court, even after the statute, saying that
such liability is governed by the law of the state of incorporation,
subject to the "procedural" provisions of the statute. 4 6 The act
of 1897 which blocked the action in Broderick v. Rosner had another section which was not mentioned in the litigation. This
provided, in substance, that no action should be maintained (either at law or in equity) to charge a stockholder in a domestic
corporation with personal liability under the law of another
state.247 The purpose of this latter section seems clear enough.
Not all states were willing to go along with the rule that the liability of stockholders is determined by the law of the state of incorporation; plausible arguments could be made that the state
in which a corporate creditor resided, and in which the creditor
contracted with the corporation, had a legitimate interest in the
application of its own law imposing personal liability on the
stockholders. 2 ' New Jersey was seeking to protect its residents
against liability thus imposed. Yet even this falls short of a forthright declaration of a policy of protecting local residents against
personal liability as corporate stockholders. New Jersey might
the next day have imposed a degree of personal liability on stockholders in domestic corporations without affecting this section;
the statute was aimed at foreign law alone, and expressed no general policy. It was as if New Jersey had said: No action shall be
maintained in our courts (i.e., against our residents) to enforce
any liability imposed by the wrongful-death statute of another
state. If New Jersey has no wrongful-death statute of its own,
this may be regarded as an attempt to make explicit the common24

6 Johnson v. Tennessee Oil, etc. Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 32, 69 AtI. 788 (Ch. 19o8).
N.J. Laws 1897, ch. 5o, § i (now NJ. REv. STAT. § 14.7-I (1937)).
248 See generally Hohfeld, The Individual Liability of Stockholders and the
247

Conflict of Laws (pts. 1-3), 9 CoLum. L. REv. 492 (igog), io COLUM. L. REV.
520 (IgIO).
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law policy of protecting the wrongdoer against liability to the
victim's family, and the state of the wrongdoer's residence has
an interest in so protecting him. Even so, such an expression of
policy is crafty and devious, couched as it is in terms of jurisdiction or procedure. The state does not forthrightly announce its
protective policy; indeed, it reserves the right to change that
policy by enacting a wrongful-death statute without, on the face
of things, affecting its declared hostility to foreign-based claims.
The portion of the statute involved in Broderick v. Rosner
probably has a similar explanation. At the time of its enactment
the question of full faith and credit to statutes imposing personal
liability on stockholders had by no means been settled, but the
developing choice-of-law rule was that the law of the state of incorporation was controlling, and that the liability would be enforced by any competent court provided it was "contractual"
rather than "penal." 249 The New Jersey legislature disliked this
choice-of-law rule and set out to change it; such actions were not
to be maintained in New Jersey courts (i.e., against New Jersey
residents) whether the liability be considered contractual or
penal, except under conditions which were impossible of fulfillment in the ordinary case. The deviousness which has been observed in the first section of the statute is repeated and aggravated here: Not only is there no forthright declaration of a policy
that local residents shall not be personally bound as stockholders;
there is not even a forthright effort to deprive the local courts of
jurisdiction, but only a Machiavellian and wholly pretended con2 0
cern for matters relating to procedure and parties.
It is not perfectly clear to me what the Supreme Court should
do when a state has not forthrightly declared a social and economic policy but when one can be inferred by patient and under249

Whitman v. Oxford Nat'l Bank, i76 U.S. 559 (igoo); Glenn v. Liggett,

o)
135 U.S. 533 (I89 ; Hawkins v. Glenn, 131 U.S. 319 (i889); Flash v. Conn, iog
U.S. 371 (1883).
250 This interpretation is substantially in agreement with that in Ross, "Full
Faith and Credit" in a Federal System, 20 Mn=-. L. Rav. 140, ,76-8o (1936). "It
is submitted the case of Broderick v. Rosner goes no further than to hold that a
state may not deny recovery on foreign facts when its own domestic law would
award recovery on parallel facts occurring within its own borders." Id. at 178. I
cannot find basis for the view that New Jersey would have imposed liability on
resident stockholders in domestic corporations; it is clear, however, that the state
had not in any law expressed a social and economic policy hostile to such liability.

See Hilpert & Cooley, The Federal Constitution and the Choice of Law,
U.L.Q. 27, 35-36 n.26 (1939).
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standing interpretation of a statute drafted to conceal, rather than
declare, the policy. The state has only itself to blame, however,
if the Court in such a case refuses to recognize the policy's existence. Broderick, therefore, presents the following situation:
New York had expressly declared a policy of protecting the creditors of banks by imposing personal liability on stockholders. It
had a clear interest in the application of the policy to a New York
bank, both for the security of local depositors and to enhance the
credit of the bank in general. New Jersey had declared no conflicting policy of protecting its residents, as stockholders, against
such liability. Neither had it suggested any reason relating to the
administration of its courts why actions to enforce such liability
should not be brought in New Jersey. It had only pretended a
concern for the procedural aspects of such actions, without giving
any explanation which would alter the character of the procedural
conditions as a merely arbitrary closing of the doors of its courts.
In such circumstances, New York having a legitimate governmental interest in the application of its policy and New Jersey
having none, the Court quite properly held that New Jersey must
entertain the action, and with equal propriety intimated that
New Jersey must apply the law of New York. 5'
251 Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643-44 (i935).

Converse v. Hamilton,

U.S. 243 (x912), is entirely consistent with this analysis. With respect to the
question of choice of law that case contains expressions which apparently disregard any interest of the forum state in the application of its own policy: "The
subject . . . is peculiarly within the regulatory power of the State of Minnesota;
so much so that no other State properly can be said to have any public policy
thereon. And what the law of Wisconsin may be respecting the relative rights and
obligations of creditors and stockholders of corporations of its creation, and the
mode and means of enforcing them, is apart from the question under consideration." Id. at 26o--6i. So far as appears, Wisconsin did not impose personal liability upon stockholders in corporations generally except for wages. Wis. Stat. §
1769 (1898) (now Wis. STAT. § 8o.4o(6) (1957)). However, the only reason offered by the Wisconsin court in Converse v. Hamilton for denying relief was that
"as to such a cause of action, the courts of this state could, if they chose, close
their doors and refuse to entertain the same." Converse v. Hamilton, 136 Wis.
224

589, 591, 118 N.W. 190, 191 (i908), rev'd,

224

U.S. 243

(1912).

This position is

traced back through Hunt v. Whewell, 122 Wis. 33, 37-38, 99 N.W. 599, 6oi (1904),
to Finney v. Guy, io6 Wis. 256, 82 N.W. 595 (igoo), aff'd, 189 U.S. 335 (i9o3), in
which the court refused relief against local stockholders in a Minnesota bank although "the nature of the statutory liability of stockholders of a bank to its
creditors under the laws of Minnesota is precisely the same as under the laws of
this state . . . ." Id. at 263, 82 N.W. at 597. Thus Wisconsin never opposed its
policy to that of Minnesota. Similarly consistent is Hancock Nat'l Bank v. Farnum,
x76 U.S. 640 (1900). In that case the Supreme Court required Rhode Island to
entertain an action by a creditor of the Commonwealth Loan & Trust Co., a Kan-
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E. Mortgage Deficienciesand Miscellaneous Subjects
When a citizen of Virginia sued a citizen of North Carolina to
recover the portion of the purchase price of Virginia land not
realized upon foreclosure of the purchase-money mortgage, the
North Carolina courts closed their doors. 252 When the case
reached the Supreme Court - not by the usual direct route, but
circuitously as a result of the plaintiff's decision to start over
again in a North Carolina federal court on the basis of diversity
of citizenship - it was held that inquiry into the constitutionality
of the North Carolina courts' refusal to afford relief was foreclosed by the principles of res judicata.253 The question of interest here is: What would have been the result if the plaintiff
had appealed directly from the Supreme Court of North Carolina
to the United States Supreme Court? In the opinion of the
Court by Mr. Justice Frankfurter there is much emphasis on his
right to take that course; 254 one would not be warranted, however, in reading into the opinion any intimation as to the outcome
of such an appeal on the merits. Mr. Justice Frankfurter was
apparently concerned only with showing that review by the Supreme Court was available as a matter of right rather than of
discretion, and that an appeal in the circumstances would have
presented a substantial federal question. Mr. Justice Reed, in
dissent, agreed as to the availability of review by appeal and expressly reserved any opinion as to the constitutional issue. 255 The
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge, however, is replete
with expressions of the opinion that the chances of a successful
appeal on the merits were so remote as to be hardly worthy of
2 56
consideration.
sas corporation, against a Rhode Island stockholder. The Rhode Island court's
excuse for refusing relief was, "Under Gen. Laws R.I. cap. 178, § 9, stockholders of
a bank are made liable for its debts, and under cap. i8o, liabilities are imposed
upon stockholders of manufacturing corporations. But the declaration does not
aver that the Commonwealth Loan and Trust Company was either of these."
Hancock Nat'l Bank v. Farnum, 20 R.I. 466, 471, 40 Ati. 341, 343-44 (i898), rev'd,
176 U.S. 640 (9oo).
Even if the technical objection to the declaration be conceded, this falls far short of an assertion of a Rhode Island policy of protecting
its residents against liability as stockholders in corporations other than banks
and manufacturing companies.
22 Bullington v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18, x6 S.E.2d 411 (1941).
253 Angel v. Bulington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
...Id. at i88-9o.
2 55
Id. at 193, 201.
2 6
' Id. at 204, 205 n. , 207, 209.
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On the basis of the precedents which have been examined here,
Mr. Justice Rutledge was too pessimistic. The interest of Virginia
in the application of its law and policy allowing recovery of the
deficiency was clear where a Virginia creditor and Virginia land
were concerned. North Carolina had expressed no contrary policy
which it might have an interest in applying for the protection of
resident purchasers. It had done no more than pass a noncommittal statute to the effect that the mortgagee should not be entitled to
a deficiency judgment, and the highest court of the state said only
that this statute was a limitation on the jurisdiction of its
courts.25 7 No explanation was offered; no reference was made to
any social or economic policy of the state; certainly nothing was
said to differentiate this kind of litigation from all the similar
litigation of a commercial sort which the courts of the state
habitually entertained. The doors of courts otherwise competent
were simply and arbitrarily closed. The statute could hardly have
been an application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, since
it was applied to an action in contract at the home of the defendant. If in truth the policy underlying the statute was one of protecting domestic debtors, in which case North Carolina would
have had a countervailing interest in the application of its own
law, the North Carolina court did not say so. Perhaps it thought,
like the New Jersey legislature with respect to the statute in Broderick, that such a policy should be dissembled. In such a case,
unless the Supreme Court is to be expected to ferret out a statutory
policy which the state court has not put forward in defense of its
own action, the full-faith-and-credit clause requires the state not
only to provide a forum but to apply the law of the only state
having a relevant policy and an interest in its application. 58
V.

The two recent cases

-

CONCLUSION

Hughes v. Fetter25 9 and First Nat'l

257 Bullington v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18, 20, 16 S.E.2d 411, 412 (194).
28 Concerning the freedom of a state to refuse a forum for foreign causes of
action against foreign corporations doing business in the state, see Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Clarendon
Boat Oar Co., 257 U.S. 533 (1922). As to the freedom of a state to close its
courts to foreign corporations not complying with local conditions for carrying
on business, see Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U.S. 274 (1927); International
Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (I9IO).
259 341 U.S. 6og (ig5i).
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Bank v. United Air Lines2 60

-

in which the Supreme Court has

dramatically held that the full-faith-and-credit clause requires
a state to provide a forum for an action predicated on the public
acts of a sister state do not, upon analysis, support that proposition. Full faith and credit to the public acts of a state implies
full faith and credit to the private rights created by those acts.
Not only did the Supreme Court disclaim any holding that the
forum must apply the law of the state of injury, but the relationship of the forum, in each case, to the parties and to the litigation
was such that under other decisions of the Court the law of the
forum was appropriately applicable as a constitutional matter.
Moreover, it is clear that under earlier decisions of the Court the
forum may disregard any provision of the foreign act purporting
to localize the action. 2 61 The result in Hughes and United Air
Lines, requiring the state to provide a forum but leaving it free
to apply its own law, is justified by the equal-protection clause
but cannot be explained by reference to the full-faith-and-credit
clause.
Although the Court has thus far consistently held that statutory
attempts by a state to localize causes of action created by its laws
are ineffectual if the cause is "transitory," its decisions have been
based upon common-law precedents which take no account of the
relations among the states in the federal system. In the future,
one may hope, the Court may adopt an approach more consistent
with the federal system and the full-faith-and-credit clause, determining the question in accordance with an analysis of the interest of the enacting state in localizing the action and the interest
of the state to which the plaintiff resorts in providing a forum.
There are situations in which the full-faith-and-credit clause
requires a state to furnish a forum for causes of action originating
under the laws of a sister state. Their most striking feature is
that, without exception, they are situations in which the forum
is also required by the full-faith-and-credit clause to apply the
law of the sister state, and in which the forum state has no policy
relating to the administration of its judicial system which would
be contravened by entertaining the action. The privileges-andimmunities clause 2 2 as well as the equal-protection clause may
require a state to furnish a forum while leaving it free to apply
U.S. 396 (1952).
See pp. 7o-78 supra.
262 See note go supra.
260 342
261
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its own law; but when the full-faith-and-credit clause requires
that a forum be provided, it requires application of the sister
state's law "to measure the substantive rights involved." 263 Otherwise, we should be continually confronted with the paradox
presented by Hughes v. Fetter - that while full faith and credit
requires that the action provided by foreign law be entertained,
it does not require recognition of the private rights created by
that law.
The cases in which the full-faith-and-credit clause requires
that a forum be provided include both actions on judgments and
actions predicated on the laws of a sister state. These may be reviewed briefly, first with respect to the point that the forum not
only must entertain the action but must also apply foreign law,
and second with respect to the point that this is true only when
the forum state interposes no exclusionary policy relating to the
functioning of its judicial system.
So far as actions on judgments are concerned, it is almost, but
not quite, a truism to say that the law of the rendering state must
be applied. The act of Congress expressly requires reference to
the law of that state.264 An element of doubt was injected by cases
which condoned the refusal to enforce a judgment when the forum
could have interposed policy objections to the enforcement of the
underlying cause of action; 265 it is now completely clear, however, that antipathy to the original cause of action is no excuse,
even though as an original matter the forum state would have had
an interest in the application of its contrary law and policy.26 6 It
may be said that with respect to all matters antedating the judgment the interest of the forum state is foreclosed. With respect
to matters subsequent to the rendition of the judgment the forum
state may assert an interest in the application of its own policy
- as, for example, that embodied in its statute of limitations;
to the extent that it may do so, there is no requirement that it
entertain the action.26 7
Turning to actions predicated upon the laws of a sister state,
26 See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 6o9, 612 n.io (I95i).
264 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1952).
262 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins.

265 (i888).
266 See p. 278 supra.
26 See M'Elmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 29o (1866).

Co.,

127 U.S.
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we find no case in which a forum has been required under the
full-faith-and-credit clause in which it is not evident that the
forum must also apply the law of the sister state. (The Hughes
and United Air Lines cases, of course, are excepted.) Huntington
v. Attril

268

presents linguistic problems in this context, since it

was a suit on a judgment; but, treating the decision as one which
may throw light on the constitutional obligation to provide a
forum for the underlying cause of action, we must conclude that
Maryland, having no connection with any of the parties nor with
the transaction, had no interest in applying any substantive policy
of its own respecting the liability of corporate directors. If the
decision, supplemented by later ones, can be construed as intimating that Maryland would be required by the full-faith-andcredit clause to entertain the original cause of action based on the
New York statute, it is equally probable that Maryland would
be required to apply the New York law. By contrast, California
in the Nichols case 219 would not be required by the full-faithand-credit clause to provide a forum - though it probably would
be required to do so by the equal-protection clause; and California should be free, according to the tenth footnote in Hughes,
to apply its own law because of its manifest interest in the case.
The Court's one clear pronouncement on full faith and credit in
the field of taxation deals with judgments, and yields very little
by way of inference as to the status of claims not based on judgments. If, however, the Court should be confronted with the
problem of full faith and credit to the taxing statutes of a sister
state, it is likely to say, as it said in the Milwaukee County case,
that "no state can be said to have a legitimate policy against payment of its neighbor's taxes .... ) 270 Accordingly, if the forum
is required to entertain the action, it will also be required to apply
the law of the taxing state. In the stockholder-liability cases,2 71
in which the full-faith-and-credit clause required that a forum be
provided, it is quite clear that the forum was required to apply
the law of the state of incorporation. In not one of these cases had
the forum declared a policy of protecting its residents against
such liability, although in Broderick v. Rosner 272 the Court, if it
U.S. 657, 666 (1892).
264 U.S. 348 (1924) ; see pp. 284-85 sufpra.
270 296 U.S. 268, 277 ('935). Cf. Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592 (X88I).
271 See pp. 286-90 supra.
272 294 U.S. 629 (x935).
208 146
209
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had been disposed to probe beneath the surface, might have found
that the procedural requirements of the New Jersey statute
camouflaged a policy of protecting them against such liability
imposed by foreign law. Finally, in Angel v. Bullington,2 73 while
the North Carolina legislature may have intended to declare a policy for the protection of local mortgagors, the North Carolina
Supreme Court did not so interpret the statute. With the clear
interest of Virginia thus opposed only by an arbitrary closing
of the doors of the courts, without reference to any declared
policy, it seems probable that North Carolina would have been
required to entertain the action -and to apply the law of Virginia.
Reviewing the cases with reference to the forum state's judicial-administration policies, and considering first those in which
the action was on a judgment, we find first of all that the Court
has regarded with indulgence- probably with too great indulgence- the interposition of a forum non conveniens policy. Indeed, it may be questioned whether the preclusive policy approved
in the Anglo-American case 2 74 was a defensible application of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. Conceding that the action was
between foreign corporations and that the cause of action "arose"
outside New York, the circumstances made resort to the courts
of that state something quite different from a gratuitous imposition upon their jurisdiction. It seems most doubtful that a court
applying the common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens
would have reached the result which the New York court reached
as a matter of statutory construction. The incentives for forumshopping are minimal where actions on judgments are concerned,
the burden on the court is slight, and the policies favoring uniform
enforcement are strong. Yet the Court recognized New York's
interest in applying a policy intended to relieve its courts of the
burden, such as it is, of such actions between foreigners. In the
Kenney case,275 Illinois interposed no such policy, but only an apparently arbitrary curtailment of the jurisdiction of its courts. In
the remaining cases in this category 276 there was no suggestion
of a policy relating to the administration of the courts, but only
hostility to the underlying cause of action.
330 U.S. 183 (1947).
..4 Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., No. i, 191 U.S. 373
273

(1903).

275 Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, Loyal Order of Moose,
278 See p. 278 & note 207 supra.

252

U.S.
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Huntington v. Attrill17 and the Milwaukee County2

7

case

may serve as a bridge between the judgment cases and those concerning actions predicated on foreign law, since they concern actions on judgments but may be regarded as having significance
for the cause of action not reduced to judgment. The most
favorable explanation of Maryland's refusal to entertain the action in Huntington is that it was grounded on a policy, similar to
that of the Supreme Court in the Pelican case,27 9 of promoting
the efficiency of local courts by shielding them from the burden
of enforcing the police regulations of other states. The Court's
decision that the underlying cause of action was not "penal"
amounts to a ruling that Maryland failed to show that the case at
bar fell within the asserted policy. The implication - if we may
assume that the Court was not simply dealing in slogans- was
that if the case had been brought within the policy the state's
interest in thus protecting its judicial system would have been
recognized. 0 The force of this implication is very considerably
impaired by the Milwaukee County case, although, as has been
observed, no policy relating to the forum's problems of judicial administration was there put forward, but only an insubstantial
policy of not intervening in the relations between the sister state
and its taxpayers. However, the solicitude shown by the Court
in Anglo-American for the forum state's judicial-administration
policies might conceivably be revived, even in an action on a
judgment for taxes, if the forum state were to put forward in
good faith an argument that its judicial system was not equipped
for the task of thus assisting in the enforcement of the revenue
laws of the other forty-nine states.
Any such development would be most unfortunate, of course.
It would amount to virtual obliteration of the progress which the
Milwaukee case represents. In the long run it would probably
disserve the true interests of all states, since the collectibility of
277

146 U.S. 657

(1892);

278 296 U.S. 268 (1935);

see pp. 280-83 supra.
see p. 285 supra.

U.S. 265 (z888); see pp. 283-84 supra.
Moreover, on its facts the case presents as good an occasion for invocation

279 127
210

of the doctrine of forum non conveniens as did the Anglo-American case. All parties were foreign and the cause of action arose outside the state. Just as in AngloAmerican, the forum was chosen because it was the only one in which the assets
of the judgment debtor could be effectively reached. But since it does not appear
that Maryland had a forum non conveniens policy, its interest in applying such a
policy is academic.
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tax judgments may be more important than the minor burden
on the courts. By the same token, the holding in Anglo-American
was most unfortunate. 281 Against such unfortunate developments
the safeguard, or remedy, which is most readily available and
least likely to produce collateral complications is a square holding
that Congress, in the exercise of its powers under the full-faithand-credit clause, has already determined that judicial-administration policies as well as social and economic policies of the
forum state must yield to the national interest, and the interest
of the rendering state, in the uniform enforcement of judgments.
In connection with claims not reduced to judgment the problem
becomes more difficult. Congress has not exercised in any meaningful way its power to declare the effect in one state of the public acts of another. The effect upon judicial-administration policies of litigation concerning matters not reduced to judgment is
likely to be relatively serious; among other things, the incentives
for forum-shopping will be greatly increased as compared with
those in actions on judgments. The Supreme Court has never
given a clear and reliable indication of its attitude toward reliance
on such policies as a reason for refusing to entertain an action on
a foreign claim not reduced to judgment.
In Huntington v. Attrill, the Court assumed that refusal to
entertain such an action raised no federal question; but clearly
this is no longer authoritative. 8 2 In Milwaukee County, the
Court expressly left open the question whether a state is required to entertain a sister state's original cause of action for
taxes, '8 3 and assumed for purposes of the decision that there was
no such requirement. If it is suggested that the same reasoning
employed by the Court could by extension be employed to override the forum's objections to entertaining the original action, it
is necessary to recall that the Court did not have occasion to deal
with the problem of the burden which such litigation would impose on the judicial system of the forum state. In the stockholder-liability cases 181 no forum state ever interposed an objection based upon a policy adopted in good faith for reasons
relating to the administration of its courts.
281 So is the implication of Huntington v. Attrill that a judgment based on a
"penal" cause of action need not be enforced if the forum interposes a policy
relating to judicial administration.
282 See note 26 supra.
283 296 U.S. at 275.
284 See pp. 286-90 supra.
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A variety of such policies is conceivable. One is that expressed
in the doctrine of forum non conveniens. It is in the highest degree unlikely that the Court would strike down such a policy,
honestly applied in accordance with precedent to protect the local
courts against the burden of litigation (of claims not reduced to
judgment) with which the state has no concern whatever, and
which rationally should be conducted elsewhere. Another, which
may be attributed to the slogans against foreign claims for penalties and taxes, is that of protecting the courts against the substantial burdens of litigation the only purpose of which is to
further what may be called the "corporate" interests of the sister state.28 5 But a state may be concerned with the character and
purpose, as well as with the quantity, of the litigation in its courts,
although its concern is solely for the courts rather than the parties. Thus New York's abolition of the remedies for alienation
of affections, criminal conversation, seduction, and breach of
contract to marry 286 expressed a social policy which reached all
persons and transactions within the scope of New York's legitimate concern, and also a policy relating to the administration of
local courts which was operative irrespective of the relationship
of the parties and events to other states. In the judgment of the
New York legislature, such litigation served no social purpose
sufficient to justify the expense of providing courts for it; moreover, the moving parties in such litigation were using the courts
as instruments of extortion and blackmail. New York may reasonably assert an interest in protecting its judicial system against
such abuses even though it has no interest in applying its social
policy to a case in which, at the relevant times, the parties and
the transactions were associated entirely with a state whose law
created substantive rights.28 7 It may be that a state's refusal to
entertain a foreign claim arising from a gambling transaction expresses a somewhat similar policy concerning the social utility of
the court system. 8
Those who believe it is the function of the courts to "weigh"
the conflicting policies of the states may feel that the problems
215

As distinguished from the governmental interests of the state, which may be

involved in private litigation.
210 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 61-b.
287 Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLUM. L.
Rv. 969, 1002 (1956); see 1947 N.Y. LAw REvisiox Comm'N REP'T 243.
288 See Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 287, at 973.
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thus presented can be solved one by one, simply by considering
in each case the character of the claim asserted and the strength
of the forum's exclusionary policy. Assuming such a process, one
might expect the prevailing spirit of "liberalism" in such matters
to call for recognition of the policy of forum non conveniens in
personal-injury cases, but to decry any effort by the forum state
to protect its courts against the burdens of foreign tax litigation;
to approve a state's refusal to permit abuse of its courts in
"heart balm" cases, but to insist upon a more sophisticated attitude toward foreign claims associated with gambling. It seems
clear that the judgments involved in such a process are purely
political and beyond the competence of any court, state or federal.
If they are to be made they must be made by Congress in the
exercise of its powers under the full-faith-and-credit clause.
There is, however, a modification of the interest-weighing approach which may deserve some consideration. When the social
and economic policies of two states are in conflict, it seems quite
clear that a court is in no position to choose between them. When,
however, the social and economic policy of one state is opposed
only by the judicial-administration policies of another, a court
might with some justification hold that the latter policy is of a
lower order and ought to yield. 8 9 This view might find some
support in an interpretation of the full-faith-and-credit clause such
as that suggested by the Court's reference to "the strong unifying
principle embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause looking
toward maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations or
rights created or recognized by the statutes of sister states
.. . 290 On such an interpretation, the clause declares a national policy of uniform recognition and enforcement of substantive rights which are admittedly created by the laws of a state;
the Constitution itself decrees that conflicting policies relating
merely to matters of procedure, or the administration of courts,
shall give way.29 ' Reflection will show, however, that such a posi289 In fact, however, in the cases involving actions on judgments the Court

has made exactly the opposite evaluation. Compare Fauntleroy v. Lum, 2XO U.S.
230 (igo8), with Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., No. x,
191 U.S. 373 (1903).
290 Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 6og, 612 (I95i).
291 Even under such an interpretation there would probably be some limits.

It would be going rather far to require a state which has only administrative
machinery for processing claims for industrial injury to provide a forum for the
adjudication of a workmen's compensation claim in accordance with foreign law.
See Note, 6 VAxD.L. Rav. 744 (1953).
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tion is untenable; the choice between conflicting state policies is
no less political when policies of judicial administration are involved than it is when only social and economic policies are involved. The subordination of procedural policies would destroy
the doctrine of forum non conveniens; and while that doctrine
is, in the main, the product of judicial decision, if it is to be declared illegitimate as state policy the declaration ought to come
from Congress, and not from the Supreme Court which has embraced the same policy for the federal judicial system." 2 It may
be that all states in the long run would benefit if each were required to enforce the tax claims of the others, despite the cost of
the increased caseload; but I do not have the information on
which to base such a judgment, and it is difficult to see how such
information could be made available to the Supreme Court, or how
the Court could justify its use to support the judgment if it were
available. Such a judgment can appropriately be made only by
the states themselves, or by Congress. With respect to "heart
balm" cases based upon the law of other states, the subordination
of procedural policies would make the courts of New York the
instruments of blackmail and extortion which they were before
1935; it will be a bold Supreme Court which interferes in such
fashion with the New York legislature's design for keeping its
own house in order.
It is instructive to compare the obligation of a state to provide
a forum for a cause of action created by federal law. The Supreme Court has never held that such an obligation exists notwithstanding an express and bona fide state policy relating
to judicial administration.2 93 When Rhode Island refused to entertain a consumer's action for damages under the Emergency
Price Control Act because the action was "penal" it gave no
policy content to that concept.2 94 It simply reiterated the formula
to the effect that no state is required to enforce the penal laws of
292 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
9

I The Court has held that the time within which an action may be brought to

enforce a federal right may not be shortened by state statutes of limitation and
nonclaim, e.g., Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 210 (i955), but in such cases the
policy of the statute as one related to the administration of the courts (as opposed
to one concerned with protection of the defendant) was not clearly asserted. Cf.
Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 5X4 (1953).
294Testa v. Katt, 71 R.I. 472, 47 A.2d 312 (1946). The fuller discussion of
the problem in Robinson v. Norato, 71 R.I. 256, 43 A.2d 467 (i945), was here
reaffirmed. The Robinson case dutifully cites The Antelope, 23 U.S. (xo Wheat.)
66 (1825). 71 R.I. at 258, 43 A.2d at 468. See p. 279 supra.
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another. Certainly there was no declaration of a Rhode Island
policy relating to the administration of courts which was inconsistent with providing a forum.29 5 Indeed, if any policy basis for
the refusal is discernible, it is one of hostility to the national pricecontrol policy and a desire to protect local enterprise against
sanctions which were deemed unduly severe. 296 Plainly, Rhode
Island had no interest in the application of such policies, the
subject being within the power of Congress and Congress having
determined what the policy should be. The supremacy clause
in such a case forecloses state social and economic policies just
as the full-faith-and-credit clause forecloses them when the subject is solely within the control of a sister state. The Supreme
Court, in reversing, justly treated Rhode Island's refusal to entertain the action as an attempt to interpose that state's own
notions of wartime price-control policy.297 Its decision does not
necessarily mean that, in the absence of an express directive from
Congress requiring the states to provide a forum for federal
causes of action, a state policy grounded in good faith upon
considerations relating to the efficiency and cost of the local
judicial system would be overridden. Indeed, the Court has made
it clear that a state may decline to entertain an action under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act on grounds of forum non conveniens, so long as that policy is applied in good faith and in a
nondiscriminatory way. 9 There is little doubt that Congress
295

The closest approach to anything of the sort is the statement that "the con-

trary view would make the state courts, nolens volens, in effect, inferior federal
courts to enforce all federal statutes, whenever congress so declares." Robinson v.
Norato, supra note 294, at 274, 43 A.2d at 475. The force of this is diminished
if one recalls that Congress was not required to set up a system of inferior
federal courts at all, and the original position of the defenders of states' rights
was that no such system should be established. See HART & WECHSLER, TnE
FEDERAL COURTS AND TEE FEDERAL SYSTEM 17-I8, 28 (953); FRANKFURTER &
LANmis, THE BusiNEss OF THE SUPREME COURT 4-5 (1927) ; Frank, HistoricalBases
of the FederalJudicialSystem, 13 LAW & CONTEM-P. PRoB. 3, 10 (1948).
29 Robinson v. Norato, 71 R.I. 256, 257, 43 A.2d 467, 468 (1945). "It is possible under that section for a landlord, who may have overcharged a weekly
tenant as trifling a sum as ten cents a week, to be mulcted in damages at the end
of the year in the sum of $26oo, plus attorney's fees and costs, although plaintiff's actual damages would be only $5.20 and costs." Id. at 262, 43 A.2d at 470.
297 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (I947).
"For the policy of the federal Act
is the prevailing policy in every state. Thus . . .this Court stated that a state
court cannot 'refuse to enforce the right arising from the law of the United States
because of conceptions of impolicy or want of wisdom on the part of Congress in
having called into play its lawfuf powers.'" Id. at 393. See also id. n.io.
"98 Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. I (igo); Douglas v.
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could, if it chose to do so, impose an obligation upon the state
courts to provide a forum for federal causes of action regardless
of local policies relating to judicial administration.2 99 Similarly,
it could impose such an obligation under the full-faith-and-credit
clause to entertain actions predicated on the laws of sister states.
It is one thing for such an obligation to be imposed by Congress,
in which all the states are represented and in which the necessary
political decision can be made on the basis of information gathered by an investigating committee. It is quite another thing for
it to be made by the Supreme Court.
I conclude that, in the absence of congressional action, the
full-faith-and-credit clause does not require a state to provide a
forum for causes of action predicated on the law of a sister state
when the refusal to do so is grounded in good faith upon a policy
of promoting the efficiency of the local courts and protecting them
against abuse.
New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377
292 U.S.
230 (1934).
9
"I

(1929);

McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry.,

See Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., supra note

298,

at 387.

HeinOnline -- 73 Harv. L. Rev. 303 1959-1960

